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It has been argued that China may stop financing the US external deficit, appreciate the currency, 
increase consumption and move its economy away from tradables and towards nontradables. Our 
two-country model shows that paradoxically this policy option is unattractive if the US authorities 
keep monetary policy sufficiently loose, thus reducing the real value of the US liabilities held by 
China. As long  as the  American and Chinese  authorities pursue complementary objectives, the 
current  China-US  arrangement  continues.  In  addition,  an  untimely  appreciation  of  China’s  real 
exchange rate may have negative consequences on employment in the US and in China.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued that China may be tempted to stop financing the US external deficit, 
increase its consumption, and move its economy away from tradables and towards nontradables. In 
this paper we present a two-country model that shows that this policy option can be unattractive if 
the US monetary policy is sufficiently loose. This conclusion may sound paradoxical in the light of 
some  conventional  wisdom  maintaining  that  US  quantitative  easing  could  induce  the  Chinese 
authorities  to  reverse  their  current  policy  of  accumulating  US  financial  assets  (see  Figure  1). 
However, this result sheds some light on the reasons why the Chinese policymakers have so for 
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Figure 1. Chinese official reserves and holdings of US Treasuries. Sources: IMF IFS and US Treasury (TIC) 
 
The insurgence and the persistence of large current account imbalances, and in particular of 
the highly unbalanced relationship between China and the US (with China recently accounting for 
more than 40% of US current account deficits), have been widely investigated. According to the 
literature, global imbalances owe both to global factors – for instance, the lack of sound non-US 
investment opportunities after the Asian crisis (Caballero et al., 2008; Mendoza et al., 2009) and the 
emergence of a global saving glut in the 2000s (Bernanke, 2005)-, and to country-specific domestic 
determinants, such as the extremely high (low) saving rates in China (US) (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 
2006; Chamon and Prasad, 2010; Roubini and Setser, 2004; Laibson and Mollerstrom, 2011) and  
2 
the undervaluation of the Chinese currency (Blanchard et al., 2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007; 
Rodrik 2008).
1 As argued elsewhere (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2010a), these domestic determinants 
should not be interpreted in isolation but rather in the light of the policy regimes adopted by the 
authorities to pursue their country-specific political objectives.  
Focusing  on  the  US  and  China  for  the  sake  of  simplicity,  this  amounts  to  arguing  that 
persistent external imbalances are rooted in the symbiotic relationship between the different growth 
paradigms adopted in the two countries, in line with the “Sino-American co-dependency” view 
proposed  by  Dooley  et  al.  (2003,  2004a,b,  2009).  China  has  purposefully  maintained  an 
undervalued exchange rate (mainly against the US dollar)
2 to foster its economic growth, through 
export promotion, and to facilitate the mobilization of its labour force into the highly productive 
sectors of the economy. To this end, China has tightly controlled the international financial flows 
and accumulated (and sterilised) an impressive amount of foreign exchange rate reserves, equal to 
about $3 trillion in early 2011.
3 The US, in turn, has exploited the Chinese willingness to finance its 
current account deficits so as to maintain high domestic consumption, while ensuring low yields on 
US Treasury bonds. As claimed by  Feldstein (2011), the  US large external deficits reflected  a 
combination of public budget deficits and low household saving, this latter in turn influenced by 
government policies discouraging personal saving. 
There has been a widespread consensus in the literature and among political commentators 
that the massive accumulation of foreign reserves pursued by China has reflected both mercantilist 
and self-insurance purposes (Aizenman and Lee, 2008). Not much attention, however, has been 
given to the reasons why this strategy has been carried on for such a long period of time (and to the 
                                                 
1 See Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and Eichengreen (2006) for an overview.  
2 In 1994/1995, the Chinese authorities started pegging the renminbi to the US dollar. The peg was substituted by a 
managed float with reference to a basket of currencies in 2005. The renminbi has gradually appreciated, passing from 
8.28 RMB per dollar in 2005 to 6.5 RMB per dollar in February 2011. For an overview of the evolution of the Chinese 
exchange rate regime, see Ferguson and Schularick (2009), Frankel (2009), Frankel and Wei (2007).  
3 According  to  Prasad  and  Sorkin  (2009),  Chinese  current  account  surpluses  accounted  for  91%  of  the  huge 
accumulation of exchange rate reserves occurred from 2004 to 2008.   
3 
observed extent) despite its inherent costs.
4 In this work, we tackle this issue by developing an 
original two-country two-period macroeconomic model able to trace some qualitative aspects of the 
Sino-American  co-dependency  story  (such  as  the  export-led  growth  due  to  an  undervalued 
exchange  rate  and  sterilised  reserves  accumulation,  marked  consumption  repression  and  high 
household  savings  in  China,  and  a  large  trade  deficit  and  overconsumption  in  the  US).  We 
investigate whether reserves hoarding has served the Chinese policy goals and has been compatible 
with the US ones: we show that this has been the case, at least as far as the Chinese and US policy 
objectives can be summarized as the maximisation, respectively, of domestic GDP and of domestic 
consumption. The juxtaposition of different policy objectives helps to understand why China has 
not yet stopped financing the US external deficits to increase Chinese consumption by depleting the 
stock of foreign reserves (thus, moving the economy from the production of tradables towards 
nontradables).
5 
In a nutshell, the model reveals that, provided the Chinese authorities aim to maximize the 
size of domestic GDP rather than consumption (as confirmed by the remarkable and persistence 
repression of private consumption), they better gear a policy regime that concentrates the labour 
force in either one of tradable and nontradable sectors as GDP tends to be higher when labour is 
unevenly allocated across the tradable and nontradable sectors. Importantly, the private choices and 
the policy measures adopted in the US affect which sector China should aim to foster. Thus, if the 
US authorities want to maximise the consumption of the US consumers, they have an incentive to 
conduct a sufficiently loose monetary policy so as to make relatively convenient for China to adopt 
and maintain an export-led growth strategy. If the US monetary policy is too tight, the real value of 
                                                 
4 A number of studies advocated a rapid rebalancing of the Chinese growth away from external demand and investment, 
and toward domestic demand and consumption (see, among the others, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006; Prasad, 2009; 
Prasad and Rajan, 2006; Straub and Thimann, 2010; Zheng et al., 2009), on the basis that the costs associated with the 
maintenance of the strategy would be larger than those stemming from a reversal of the policy. 
5 In addition, we show in a companion paper (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2010b) that reverting the Chinese strategy might 
have  some  undesirable  consequences  on  both  countries:  the  Chinese  rate  of  growth  may  be  reduced  and  the 
maintenance of full employment and high levels of consumption in the US may be jeopardized.  
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the US financial assets held by China may increase and lure the Chinese authorities to deplete the 
accumulated stocks of US assets, to stop financing the US external deficit and to let appreciate the 
currency.  
This theoretical model allows to depict the past and current relationship between the Sino-
American exchange rate regime, on the one hand, and the policy objectives of the authorities both in 
the US and in China, on the other hand. However, the model is also conducive to predictions that 
help  appreciate  the  future  evolution  of  the  China-US  co-dependency.  For  instance,  the  model 
suggests that, unless a deflationary process takes place in the US or unless the Chinese authorities 
decide  to  let  domestic  consumption  expand  more  rapidly  than  in  the  past,  the  current  Chinese 
strategy will not be rapidly reversed and China will keep on accumulating US assets. To make sure 
that a policy reversal will not occur (as this would reduce consumption opportunities to the US 
citizens), the American authorities have an incentive to conduct a sufficiently loose monetary policy. 
This is not, as often thought, out of an attempt to inflate the debt away,
6 but rather in order to 
preserve the convenience for China to stick to  its export-led cum reserve accumulation growth 
strategy. 
Aizenman and Lee (2010) represents the closest attempt to investigate the reasons why a 
mercantilist  approach,  characterised  by  an  undervalued  exchange  rate  and  the  accumulation  of 
foreign reserves, has so far represented a viable policy regime for the Chinese authorities. The 
authors  show  that  a  learning-by-doing  externality  in  the  production  of  tradables  calls  for  an 
undervalued exchange rate because the latter may be used as a tool to internalize the externality. 
Besides the different mechanisms driving growth in their and in our models, our work differs from 
theirs in that we consider both the US and the Chinese objectives and policy measures and their 
interaction, rather than focusing on China in isolation. This is of utmost importance if the Sino-US 
unbalanced  relationship  is  to  be  interpreted  as  the  result  of  a  mutually  beneficial  relationship 
between countries pursuing different, but complementary goals. 
                                                 
6 On the possibility that the US may inflate its debt away, see e.g. Aizenman and Marion (2009).  
5 
Without  stretching  the  model  too  much,  some  lessons  for  the  future  of  the  Sino-US 
relationship could be drawn from our analysis. The first one is that the duration of the exchange rate 
undervaluation cum reserve accumulation strategy is not determined by the size of the Chinese 
foreign  reserves  per  se.  In  fact,  it  is  mainly  influenced  by  the  convenience  for  the  Chinese 
authorities  to  maintain  their  productive  specialization  on  tradables  and  keep  consumption 
compressed rather than expand the production of nontradables and domestic consumption. Second, 
we show that this convenience depends also on the US monetary policy stance. The third lesson is 
that the standard of living that the Chinese authorities desire to guarantee to their citizens is key to 
determine the likelihood of a policy regime change: the higher the pursued standard, the more likely 
the occurrence of a reversal. Finally, given that in the US a larger share of the labour force is 
employed in the nontradable sector than in China, the immediate effects of an appreciation of the 
renminbi on total employment may be negative in both countries, thereby increasing the number of 
unemployed people in the US and swelling the ranks of workers employed in the backward sectors 
of the Chinese economy. 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The building blocks and the derivation of 
the model are discussed in section 2, while the characterization of the equilibrium is presented in 
section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
  The  world  economy  includes  two  countries,  US  and  China.  Three  market  goods  are 
produced in this world economy: an internationally tradable good that is produced in both countries, 
an  (internationally)  nontradable  good  that  is  produced  and  sold  in  US, and  an  (internationally) 
nontradable  good that is produced and sold in  China. Hence, in both countries there are firms 
specialized  in  the  production  of  tradable  goods  and  firms  specialized  in  the  production  of 
nontradable goods. The tradable good is used as capital in the production of both goods and as  
6 
consumption good, while the nontradable good can be only consumed.
7 Labour is internationally 
immobile but can freely move across sectors within each country. Labour that is not employed in 
the two market sectors undertakes non-market activities. In the case of China, the latter can be 
interpreted as those low-productive activities that are typical of rural areas.   
Goods  and  labour  markets  are  perfectly  competitive.  Both  countries  are  populated  by 
households  that  supply  labour,  buy  the  consumer  goods,  accumulate  financial  assets  and  hold 
money. Moreover, each country has its own government sector. The policy regime governing the 
world financial markets is characterized by the fact that the Chinese authorities fix the nominal 
exchange rate and permit only official transactions in financial assets. In line with their public 
announcements and  actual choices, we  assume that the Chinese authorities aim at reaching the 
highest level of GDP that is consistent with the achievement of an acceptable level of households’ 
consumption. Indeed, this objective is functional to fasten China’s catching-up and to enhance its 
international  status,  although  it  has  costs  in  terms  of  households’  welfare.  In  contrast,  the  US 
authorities are assumed to maximize the consumption of the representative household.   
  There is no source of random disturbances and agents’ expectations are rational (in the sense 
that they are consistent with the true processes followed by the relevant variables), thus implying 
perfect  foresight.
8 Finally,  time  is  discrete  and—for  the  sake  of  simplicity  but  without  loss  of 
generality—two periods are considered: the present and the future.  
                                                 
7 As argued by Turnovsky (1997), there is no agreed conclusion on the share of tradables and nontradables in total 
investment. For some evidence on the issue, see Bems (2008). 
8 The distinction between two main sectors (tradables and nontradables) and the assumption that labour is mobile across 
sectors but not across countries while the capital good is mobile both across sectors and countries are consistent with the 
standard trade model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 4). We extend this framework by introducing a 
technological spillover in both sectors.  
7 
Firms producing the (internationally) nontradable good 
In each country j, j=us, ch, there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms, 
which—in each period t, t=0,1—produce the nontradable good YjNt. This good is not storable and 
must be immediately consumed.
9 Firms produce YjNt according to the following technology:  
1 0   , L K A Y j jNt
- 1
jNt jNt jNt
j j < < = g
g g
,                       (1) 
where KjNt and LjNt are, respectively, the capital stock and the labour input used in country j to 
produce the (internationally) nontradable market good YjNt, and AjNt is a variable measuring the 
state  of  technology  of  the  firms  operating  in  that  sector  of  country  j  which  produces  the 
(internationally) nontradable good YjNt. It is assumed that AjNt is a positive function of the capital 
installed in the sector of j which produces YjNt: 
j
jNt jNt K A
g
= .
10 This assumption combines the idea 
that learning-by-doing works through each firm’s capital investment and the idea that knowledge 
and productivity gains spill over instantly across all firms (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Therefore, in accordance with Frankel (1962), it is supposed that although AjNt is endogenous to the 
economy, each firm takes it as given, since a single firm’s decisions have only a negligible impact 
on the aggregate stock of capital of the nontradable sector.
11  
  In each t, the net profit (cash flow) pjNt of the representative firm producing nontradables is 
given by: 
pjNt=PjNtYjNt-WjtLjNt-PjTtIjNt, IjNt³0,              (2) 
                                                 
9 Typically, consumer services are consumed while they are produced. 
10 Consistently with this formal set-up, one can interpret technological progress as labour augmenting. 
11 This amounts to say that technological progress is endogenous to the economy, although it is an unintended by-
product of firms’ capital investment rather than the result of purposive R&D efforts.  
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where PjNt and PjTt are, respectively, the price of the nontradable good and the price of the tradable 
good in country j at time t, Wjt is the nominal wage in country j at time t, and  IjNt is capital 
investment by the representative firm producing nontradables in country j at time t.   
  The capital stock installed in the nontradable sector evolves according to 
KjNt+1=IjNt+(1-δj)KjNt,  0£ δj £1,  KjN0 given.         (3) 
  Firms  decide  on    I   , L   , L jN0 jN1 jN0 and  jN1 I  subject  to  (3)  in  order  to  maximize  their 
discounted sequence of net profits  
         





p ,                  (4) 
where ijt is the nominal interest rate in country j at time t. 
Firms producing the (internationally) tradable good 
In each country j, there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms producing 
the (internationally) tradable good YjTt. In each period t, these firms produce YjTt according to the 




jTt jTt jTt L K A Y
a a = , 0<aj<g j,                       (5) 
where KjTt and LjTt are, respectively, the capital stock and the labour input used in country j to 
produce the (internationally) tradable market good YjTt. Notice that it is assumed that the labor 
elasticity  of  output  is  larger  in  the  sector  producing  nontradables  than  in  the  sector  producing 
tradables. Finally, AjTt is a variable measuring the state of technology of the firms operating in that 
sector of country j which produces the (internationally) tradable good YjTt. Finally, AjTt is a positive 
function of the capital installed in the sector of j which produces YjTt: 
j
jTt jTt K A
a
= . 
  In each t, the net profit pjTt of the representative firm producing tradables is given by 
p jTt=PjTtYjTt-WjtLjTt-PjTtIjTt,    IjTt³0,             (6) 
where IjTt is capital investment by the representative firm producing tradables in country j at time t.    
9 
  The capital stock installed in the tradable sector evolves according to 
KjTt+1=IjTt+(1-δj)KjTt,  0£ δj£1,  KjT0 given.         (7) 
Firms decide on    I   , L   , L jT0 jT1 jT0 and  jT1 I  subject to (7) in order to maximize their discounted 
sequence of net profits  
                               





p .              (8) 
Households   
  Households live for two periods. Their large number living in country j is normalized to be 
one (population’s size is constant).  
  Consumption and real money balances providing liquidity services enter the period utility 
function of the representative household of country j, ujt:  
0    ,
P
M
ln ) C ln( u j
jt
jt








+ = c c ,                       (9) 
where Mjt and Pjt are, respectively, the household’s nominal money holdings and the consumer 
price index in country j at time t, and Cjt is the consumption index for the households located in 
country j at time t. The consumption index is defined as 
1 0    , C C C j
- 1
jTt jNt jt
j j < < = h
h h ,
        (10)                                                                                  
where CjNt and CjTt are, respectively, the  consumption of nontradables  and the  consumption of 
tradables by the  representative household located in country j  at time t. Notice that Cjt can be 
interpreted as a composite good. Given (10), PjNt and PjTt, the consumer price index Pjt is obtained 
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10 
  The amount of labour supplied by the representative household of country j in period t, 
s
jt L , 


















jt                   (12) 
where  Hj  is  the  fixed  time  endowment  of  each  household  located  in  country  j,  and  Vjt  is  the  
reservation wage for households located in j at time t. One could argue that this reservation wage is 
exogenously given and depends on labour productivity in non-market activities, which in the case 
of China may be interpreted as those activities typical of the traditional sector where low-productive 
technologies are utilized for subsistence consumption
12 (largely coincident with China’s primary 
sector).  
  Besides determining 
s
j0 L and 
s
j1 L  according to (12), the representative household decides on 
Mj0, CjN0, CjT0, BjH1, Mj1, CjN1, CjT1 and BjH2 in order to maximize its sequence of discounted 
utilities 
1 0    , u u j j1 j j0 < < + q q ,      (13)  
satisfying the period budget constraints:  
BjHt+1+Mjt+PjNtCjNt+PjTtCjTt£(1+ijt)BjHt+Mjt-1+πjNt+πjTt+LjtWjt-Tjt,  t=0,1,     (14)  









+ 0,1.   t ch, j   if    ) 0 , -B min(
   us, j   if    ) 0 , R - -B min(
B
1 chGt
1 cht 1 usGt
1 jHt                  (15) 
In (13)-(14), θj represents the subjective discount factor of country j’s households, BjHt are the 
domestic financial assets accumulated during period t-1 by the representative household of country j 
and carried over into period t with nominal yield ijt, Ljt are the units of labour worked by the 
representative household of country j in period t, Tjt are the net monetary transfers (“net taxes”) 
                                                 
12 The net utility that the representative household gets by undertaking the non-market activities is assumed to be zero.  
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from the representative household of country j to its government in t. In (15), BjGt are the domestic 
financial assets accumulated during period t-1 by the j-country’s government sector and carried 
over into period t with nominal yield ijt, and Rcht are the Chinese foreign reserves, that is the US 
financial  assets  (denominated  in  US  currency)  accumulated  during  period  t-1  by  the  Chinese 
government sector and carried over into period t with nominal yield iust. The condition (15) imposes 
a limit to the possibility of the private sector to go into debt. In particular, it implies that the US 
private  sector  may  go  into  debt  in  period  t  ( 0 B 1 usHt < + )  only  if  in  that  period  the  Chinese 
accumulation  of  foreign  assets  exceeds  the  debt  issued  by  the  US  public  sector,  i.e.,  if 
0 R - B - 1 cht 1 usGt < + + ,  while the Chinese private sector may go into debt in t ( 0 B 1 chHt < + ) only if 
in that period the Chinese public sector is willing to be a net holder of domestic financial assets, i.e., 
if  0 B - 1 chGt < + . This asymmetry in the possibility of the private sectors of the two countries to go 
into debt is due to the fact that the Chinese capital account is not liberalized: the only international 
transactions in financial assets that can take place are those operated by the Chinese authorities. 
Furthermore,  notice  that  in  each  period  the  representative  household  of  country  j  is  entitled  to 
receive the net profits earned by the firms located in its own country as dividend payments. It 
should  be  also  apparent  that  nominal  balances  (no-interest  bearing  financial  assets)  Mjt  are 
accumulated during period t and carried over into period t+1 because of the liquidity services that 
they provide to the households.  
Government sector  
  At time 0, both governments implement their policies for the current period and announce 
their policies for period 1. The governments of the two countries have different policy objectives. In 
particular, the US authorities decide on Mus0, Tus0, BusG1, Mus1, Tus1 and BusG2 in order to maximize 
the US households’ discounted sequence of consumption 
us1 us us0 C C q + ,                        (16) 
satisfying the period budget constraints:   
12 
BusGt+1£Must-Must-1+Tust+(1+iust)BusGt,   t=0,1,          (17)  
BusG0, ius0, Mus-1 given, and—in accordance with (15)—the condition:            
) 0 , R - -B min( B 1 cht 1 usHt 1 usGt + + + ³ ,  t=0,1.                  (18) 
  Moreover, the Chinese authorities decide on Ech0, Mch0, Tch0, BchG1, Rch1, Ech1, Mch1, Tch1, 










q + , 
13                                             (19) 
satisfying  Cch0³ ch0 C ,  Cch1³ ch1 C  ( cht C  is  the  minimum  level  of  consumption  that  the  Chinese 
authorities desire to guarantee to their citizens in period t), the period budget constraints:  
BchGt+1+EchtRcht+1£Mcht-Mcht-1+Tcht+(1+icht)BchGt+Echt(1+iust)Rcht,   t=0,1,       (20)   
BchG0, Rch0, ich0, ius0, Mch-1  given, and—in accordance with (15)—the conditions: 
) 0 , -B min( B 1 chHt 1 chGt + + ³ ,  t=0,1,                            (21) 
0 R 1 cht ³ + ,  t=0,1.                                               (22) 
In (19)-(20),  jTt jTt jNt jNt jt Y P Y P GDP + º  is the nominal GDP of country j at time t, Ejt (Ejt=1/Eit, 
j i ¹ ) is the nominal exchange rate of country j at time t (the price in units of the j-country’s 
currency  of  one  unit  of  the  i-country  currency  at  time  t).  It  should  be  recalled  that  the  only 
international transactions in financial assets that can take place are those operated by the Chinese 
authorities, which can fix Echt and adjust consistently their foreign asset holdings. 
Markets equilibrium conditions 
  Markets for labour and for the nontradable good are purely domestic. In equilibrium, the 





> entailing  Ljt=LjNt+LjTt=Hj,  or  by 
                                                 
13 Notice in (19) that the nominal GDP is deflated by the consumer price index.  
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= . Equilibrium in the country j’s market for the nontradable 
good requires:  
YjNt=CjNt.             (23) 
  The market for the tradable good is internationally integrated. Equilibrium in this market 
requires: 
YusTt+YchTt=CusTt+CchTt+IusNt+IusTt+IchNt+IchTt.          (24) 
  In this internationally integrated market, the one-price law must hold:   
          PjTt=EjtPiTt,  i≠j,                                     (25) 





jt M M = .                     (26) 
  Equilibrium in the markets for financial assets requires                     
            BusHt+BusGt+Rcht=0                                 (27) 
and 
         BchHt+BchGt=0.                                 (28) 
Notice that the Chinese stock of foreign reserves is the counterpart of the US negative net foreign 
asset position, and that the Chinese net holdings of domestic assets are equal to zero.
14 
3.  THE EQUILIBRIUM 
  The equilibrium solutions that we consider must satisfy: 
                                                 
14 Typically,  the  People’s  Bank  of  China  seeks  to  compensate  the  accumulation  of  foreign  reserves  by  selling 
sterilisation bills to domestic agents, so as to keep control over money supply. As a result of this kind of operations, it is 
normally the case that the government sector reduces its holdings of domestic assets, while private agents increase 
theirs. However, for our purposes, it is not necessary to model the specific modalities whereby the Chinese central bank 
controls the supply of money while accumulating foreign reserves. What is essential for us is that an increase in the 
government sector’s holdings of foreign assets has its counterpart in an improvement of the country’s trade account.   
14 
(i) Agents’ rationality. In particular, they presume that both governments choose their policies by 
taking  into  account  the  private  agents’  decision  rules,  which  in  their  turn  incorporate  the 
governments’ policy rules (the solutions to the private agents’ optimization problems can be found 
in the Appendix). 
 (ii)  Time  consistency.  This  is  relevant  since  in  this  context  there  is  no  mechanism  allowing 
governments to make credible pre-commitments. Hence, announcements of policies that are not 
time-consistent  cannot  be  credible,  and  policy  rules  that  are  not  self-enforcing  cannot  be 
equilibrium solutions to the agents’ problem.  
  Furthermore, these equilibrium solutions are such that: 
(iii)  They  do  not  account  for  the  possibility  of  formal  defaults.  The  fact  that  breaches  of  debt 
contracts are ruled out is an acceptable simplification, since in this context a) it is the consolidated 
(private+government  sector)  balance  sheet  of  each  national  economy  that  matters,  making 
immaterial  how  the  holding  of  domestic  asset  (BjHt+BjGt)  is  divided  up  between  private  and 
government sector (hence, there is ample room for government policies that—by increasing the 
public debt—allow the households to reduce their liabilities and to be solvent, with no real effect on 
both economies), and b) the indebted country (the US) may always exploit the privilege of having 
its external debt denominated in its own currency by inflating it away, thus making unnecessary and 
unrealistic the option of a formal default.  
(iv) They assume that in each period the US government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the 
Chinese government. In particular, this assumption intends to capture the realistic situation where 
the US authorities decide on their monetary policy by anticipating the optimal Chinese reaction to it 
in terms of nominal exchange-rate policy, money supply and accumulation of foreign reserves.   
Period 1 
  To  obtain  time-consistent  solutions,  we  solve  the  authorities’  problems  by  backward 
induction, thus starting from period 1. As preliminary steps for solving these problems, we focus on 
some relations holding in equilibrium among variables belonging to each national economy.   
15 
  First, one can verify (see the Appendix) that 
0    ), K , K , (L L
jTt L jNt jTt jTt jNt < = l l .                           (29)                                   
Equation (29) reflects the fact that in equilibrium a higher employment level in the tradable sector is 
accompanied  by  a  fall  in  the  relative  price  of  the  nontradables  that  leads  to  a  lower  level  of 
employment in the nontradable sector.  
  Second,  moving  economy  j  away  from  the  production  of  nontradables  and  towards  the 
production of tradables is also associated in period 1 with an improvement of its trade account. 
Hence, one can check (see the Appendix) that  
0     ), K , K , (L
P
TA
jT1 L jN1 jT1 jT1
jT1
j1 > = f f ,                         (30) 
where  ( ) jTt jNt jTt jTt jTt jt I - I - C - Y P TA º  is  the  trade  account  of  country  j  (denominated  in  j 
currency) at time t. The adjustment required in period 1 to have an equilibrium where country j 
produces less nontradables and more tradables implies that this country reduces its absorption.  
  Third, it is not surprising that in general a re-balancing leading country j to produce less 
nontradables and more tradables brings about a compression of current consumption. Indeed (see 
the Appendix):    
0    ), K , K , (L C
jTt L jNt jTt jTt jt < = c c .       (31) 
An implication of (31) is that there exists an upper limit  ( ) chNt chTt cht chTt K , K , C L a = ,  0
cht C < a ,  to 
the  units  of  labour  that  according  to  the  Chinese  authorities  it  is  desirable  to  allocate  for  the 
production of tradables. Notice that this upper limit is a negative function of the minimum level of 
consumption that the Chinese authorities desire to guarantee to their citizens. 
  Fourth, real GDP and the employment level in the tradable sector are linked by an U-shaped 






< < > >
< <
=
, H L ˆ 0   , L ˆ  L if    0
L ˆ  L if    0
   ), K , K , (L
P
GDP
j jTt jTt jTt
jTt jTt
L jNt jTt jTt
jt
jt
jTt v v         (32)  
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where  jTt L ˆ  is that level of LjTt at which country’s j real GDP reaches its minimum. Equation (32) 
captures the fact that—given the stocks of capital installed in the two sectors—a country’s real GDP 
is  larger  if  labour  is  heavily  concentrated  either  in  the  production  of  nontradables  or  in  the 
production of nontradables. This is because an equilibrium where the national economy is highly 
specialized  in  the  production  of  nontradables  (tradables)  is  possible—in  the  presence  of 
technologies characterized by decreasing marginal productivity of labour—only if the relative price 
of the nontradable (tradable) good is extremely high. In other words, the quantity produced by the 
nontradable  (tradable)  sector  is  very  large  whenever  the  relative  price  of  the  nontradables 
(tradables) is very high, thus explaining why real GDP tends to be higher when labour is unevenly 
distributed across the two sectors than when it is evenly allocated in the production of the two 
goods.  
         We can now highlight some relations holding in equilibrium among variables belonging to 
the different countries. 
  We start by using (30) to rewrite (24), i.e., the condition for equilibrium in the world market 
for the tradable good, as   









ch1 = + = + f f , to which one can apply the 
implicit function theorem so as to obtain:   
  i j    , 0    ), K , K , K , K , (L L
iT1 L jN1 jT1 iN1 iT1 iT1 jT1 ¹ < = n n .         (33) 
Equation (33) establishes that, for keeping in equilibrium the world market for the tradable good, an 
increase in the employment level of country i’s tradable sector must be offset by a decrease in the 
employment level of country j’s tradable sector. 
  Secondly, we can use the equilibrium relationship between the price of the tradable good and 
the quantity of money  0    ), K , K , (L M P
jT1 L jN1 jT1 jT1 j1 jT1 > = g g  (see the Appendix) to rewrite the  
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Q º ,  to 
which again one can apply the implicit function theorem so as to obtain: 
     ( ) 0   , 0   , K , K , K , K , L , Q L
chT1 1 L Q usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 chT1 1 usT1 > < = h h h .       (34) 
Equation (34) shows the channel whereby the Chinese authorities can influence how much tradable 
good is produced in the world economy and in which country is localized its production:  given the 
US monetary policy, i.e., given Mus1, they can manoeuvre Q1 in order to control their real exchange 
rate and affect employment and output in both countries.
15  
  The possibility for the Chinese authorities to manoeuvre Q1 for influencing employment and 
output in their country is more apparent by using (34) to rewrite the condition (24) for equilibrium 
in the world market for the tradable good as 
( ) 0 ) K , K , K , K , K , K , L , Q ( ) K , K , (L usN1 usT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 chT1 1 chN1 chT1 chT1 = + h f f , to   
which once again one can apply the implicit function theorem so as to obtain:  
( ) 0    , K , K , K , K , Q L
1 Q usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1 chT1 > = y y .   (35) 
Equation (35) can be used for rewriting (33) as  
( ) 0    ), K , K , K , K , K , K , K , K , Q ( L
1 chT1 Q L usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1 usT1 < = y n y n .  (36) 
One can easily conclude from equations (35) and (36) that in period 1 the Chinese authorities can 
increase (depress) employment and production in the Chinese (US) tradable sector by setting a 
higher Q1, namely by depreciating their real exchange rate. However, one can see from (31), (35) 
and (36) that by doing so they depress (increase) the consumption of the Chinese (US) households. 
Hence, the Chinese authorities are not willing to depreciate their real exchange rate beyond a certain 
limit because otherwise they would compress the consumption of the Chinese households below an 
acceptable threshold: there exists an upper bound  1 Q  above which the Chinese authorities do not 
                                                 
15 The possibility by the Chinese authorities to exert a perfect control on the real exchange rate rests on their ability to 
fully sterilise any purchase of US assets.  
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intend  to  set  Q1,  where  ), K , K , K , K , C ( Q usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 ch1 1 m =   , 0
ch1 C < m  is  that  value  of  Q1 
satisfying  ( ) ( ) usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1 chN1 chT1 ch1 chT1 K , K , K , K , Q K , K , C L y a = = ,  and  ch1 C  is  assumed  to 
be such that  chT1 chT1 L ˆ L > . Notice that the level of  1 Q  depends negatively on  ch1 C : if the minimum 
standard of living that the Chinese authorities desire to guarantee to their citizens is higher, the limit 
beyond which they do not want to depreciate China’s real exchange rate is more stringent.  
  It is straightforward that the accumulation of China’s foreign reserves has to accommodate 
the real-exchange rate policy pursued by the Chinese authorities. This can be seen by noticing that 
China’s foreign reserves evolve according to Rcht+1-Rcht=iustRcht-TAust, from which—by dividing 
both sides by PusTt—we obtain: 
) K , K , (L
P
R - )R i (1
usNt usTt usTt
usTt
1 cht cht ust f =
+ + .    (37) 
By using (36) and the fact that  0    ), K , K , (L M P
usT1 L usN1 usT1 usT1 us1 usT1 > = g g  (see the Appendix), 
one can rewrite (37) as  
( )
( ) ) K , K ), K , K , K , K , K , K , K , K , Q ( (         
) K , K ), K , K , K , K , K , K , K , K , Q ( ( M
R - )R i (1
usNt usTt usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1








In (38), a higher Q1 has to be accommodated by an increase in Rch2. In contrast, an appreciation of 
the  Chinese  real  exchange  rate  (a  lower  Q1)  worsens  China’s  trade  account:  in  principle,  the 
Chinese authorities may appreciate their real exchange rate up to the point where Rch2=0, namely up 
to the point where their trade account deficit can be fully financed by the credits accumulated in the 
past  vis-à-vis  the  US.  Therefore,  the  level  of  Q1  satisfying  (38)  when  Rch2=0,  say 
1 Q ,  is  the 
minimum at which the Chinese authorities can push Q1 without becoming indebted to the US:  
0   , 0   ), K , K , K , K , )R i (1 , (M Q
ch1 us1 us1 )R i (1 M usN1 usT1 usN1 usT1 ch1 us1 us1 1 < > + = + q q q .     (39)  
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The lower bound given by (39) represents the minimum at which the Chinese authorities can set Q1, 
since it is not in the interest of the US to lend to China so as to allow it to finance the trade deficit 
associated with Q1<
1 Q . Indeed, the consumption of the US representative household is such that  
( )
( ) ) K , K ), K , K , K , K , K , K , K , K , Q ( (                
) K , K ), K , K , K , K , K , K , K , K , Q ( (
usNt usTt usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1
"
1







   (40)           
for any 
'
1 Q  and 
"




1 Q Q >  (see Figure 2). The bound 
1 Q  is associated with a lower limit 
( ) usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1 chT1 K , K , K , K , Q L y =  to  the  units  of  labour  that  the  Chinese  authorities  can 
allocate for the production of tradables. 
 
Figure 2. The relationship in period 1 between US consumption and employment in the Chinese tradable sector. 
 
  We are now ready to characterize the decision rule of the Chinese authorities in period 1. 
Indeed,  considering  the  U-shaped  relationship  between  real  GDP  and  LjT1  given  by  (32),  it  is 
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    (41) 
The rule (41) says that the Chinese authorities are going to depreciate their real exchange rate up to 
the point that guarantees the minimum acceptable level of consumption to the Chinese households 
   chT1 L    chT1 L ˆ
   chT1 L     Hch 
LchT1 
      
0 
 
  ) K , K ), K , K , K , K , (L ( usN1 usT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 chT1 n c   Cus1  
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(Q1= 1 Q ), thus giving an export-led characterization to their economy, if in this way they can reach 
a higher level of real GDP than the level reachable by appreciating their real exchange up to the 
point that they cease to accumulate US assets (Q1=
1 Q ), thus using the credits accumulated in the 
past  to  run  a  trade  account  deficit  and  to  specialize  China’s  economy  in  the  production  of 
nontradables.     
 




Figure 4. The decision rule of the Chinese authorities in period 1 (case in which  us1 us1 M M < ) 
 
  The US authorities can influence the decision of the Chinese policy-makers. It is apparent, 
indeed, that it is in the interest of the US authorities to have  1 1 Q Q =  (leading to  chT1 chT1 L L = ) 
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1 1 Q Q =  (leading to  chT1 chT1 L L = ), since 
1 1 Q Q > (see (40) and Figure 2). To influence 
the Chinese authorities’ decision, the US authorities can inflate the US external debt by increasing 
Mus1,  thus  augmenting 
1 Q  (see  (39))  and  chT1 L  (see  (35)):  by  reducing  the  real  value  of  their 
outstanding debt, the US authorities may lower the benefit that the Chinese authorities can achieve 
by ceasing to accumulate US assets and running a trade account deficit financed with the credits 
accumulated in the past. In this way, the US authorities can make more convenient for their Chinese 
counterparts  to  set  1 1 Q Q = ,  namely  to  continue  in  period  1  to  accumulate  US  assets  and  to 
specialize their economy in the production of tradables. More precisely, it is optimal for the US 
authorities to set  us1 us1 M M > , where  us1 M  is that value of Mus1 satisfying    
( ) = ) K , K , K , K , K , K , Q ( chN1 chT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1 y v  
( ) ) K , K , K , K , K , K , Q (                                                           chN1 chT1 usN1 usT1 chN1 chT1 1 y v =  and 
1 Q  is 







: the larger are the credits that China 
accumulated in the past, the larger has to be Mus1 in order to induce the Chinese authorities to go on 
lending to the US. 
  Another way to look at the situation described above is by emphasizing that there is a limit 
to the possibility for the Chinese authorities to preserve their real variables from variations due to 
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 unchanged.  Once  Rch2=0,  any  further  increase  in  Mus1  forces 
China to appreciate its real exchange rate, thus reducing the maximum trade deficit (in units of the 
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  We may briefly summarize our discussion in the proposition below:  
22 
Proposition  1  The  equilibrium  emerging  in  the  future  (i.e.,  in  period  1)  is  such  that  the  US 
authorities will inflate the US external debt up to the point where the Chinese authorities have no 
convenience to stop accumulating US financial assets, and to use the credits accumulated in the past 
to increase China’s current consumption and move its production away from tradables and towards 
nontradables.  
Proof: see the discussion above.  
Period 0 
  To save space, in period 0 we solve the model only for the case that is more realistic, namely 
the case where parameter values and initial conditions are such that the emerging equilibrium is 
characterized in both countries by some persistent “unemployment”, i.e., by the fact that both in 
period 0 and in period 1 some labour is not employed in the market sectors because real wages 
cannot be pushed below the reservation wages of the workers to insure full employment.  
  Differently than in period 1, in period 0 the authorities of both countries must take into 
account the effects of their policies on the accumulation of physical capital. However, the logic 
underlying the policy makers’ behaviour in period 0 is similar to that dictating their choices in the 
final period. Indeed, China’s sequence of discounted real GDP and policy-relevant levels of LchT0 
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where  chT0 L ~  is that level of LchT0 at which China’s sequence of discounted real GDP reaches its 
minimum.  Moreover,  by  using 
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 (see  the  Appendix),  one  can 
rewrite  the  one-price  law  (25)  as  0 ) K , K , (L Q - ) K , K , (L usN0 usT0 usT0 0 chN0 chT0 chT0 = g g , 
) M M ( M M
) M M ( M M E
Q
us1 us0 us ch1 ch0






, thus showing that the Chinese authorities can manoeuvre Q0 
in order to control their real exchange rate and affect employment and output in both countries.  
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Finally, one can check for relevant ranges of parameter values and initial conditions that given the 
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. Therefore, also in period 0—as in period 1—there is a limit beyond which the 
Chinese authorities are  not willing to depreciate their real exchange  rate for not pushing  LchT0 
above  chT0 L  and Cch0 below  ch0 C , where  ch0 C  is such that  chT0 chT0 L ~ L > . Similarly, there exists a 
lower bound 
0 Q below which the Chinese cannot set Q0. Thus, also in period 0 the choice for the 
Chinese authorities is between two options, that is between setting Q0=
0 Q  or Q0= 0 Q , while for the 
US  authorities  it  is  convenient  to  manage  Mus0  so  as  to  make  less  attractive  for  their  Chinese 
counterparts the option of setting Q0=
0 Q , thus inducing them to set Q0= 0 Q  and accumulate US 
financial assets.  
Employment implications 
  Let us suppose that there is an increase in the minimum standard of living that the Chinese 
authorities desire to guarantee to their citizens in the present (higher  ch0 C ). This will lead to an 
appreciation of the Chinese real exchange rate (lower  0 Q ), and in equilibrium to a lower LchT0 and 
a  higher  LusT0.  What  are  the  immediate  effects  of  this  change  on  unemployment  in  the  two 
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where 






















































=  (see the Appendix). One can see from (43) that it 
is more likely that a higher LjT0 boosts total employment in a country whose employment level in 
the nontradable sector is relatively low with respect to LjT0 because its initial endowments of capital 
in the two sectors are relatively poor with respect to its workers’ reservation wage. Admitting that 
this is the situation of China, while the US is in the opposite situation having a larger share of their 
total employment in the nontradable sector, it is quite possible that the immediate effects of an 
appreciation of the Chinese real exchange rate on total employment are negative in both countries. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The accumulation of foreign reserves by the Chinese authorities has been part and parcel of 
the export-led growth strategy pursued to foster the expansion of the gross domestic product and the 
mobilization  of  the  labour  force  from  rural  to  more  advanced  activities.  The  US,  in  turn,  has 
benefited from keeping consumption high through the accumulation of external deficits, to a large 
extent financed by China. 
Our  two-country  two-period  macroeconomic  model  captures  the  symbiotic  relationship 
linking the US to China in recent years, reproduces some stylised aspects of the “Sino-American co-
dependency”, and helps to rationalise the pros and cons of the accumulation of foreign reserves in 
China in the light of the policy objectives pursued by both the Chinese and the US authorities.
16 
Hence, this work contributes to the debate on global imbalances and on global rebalancing in that it 
originally focuses on the interdependence between the objectives and the policy strategies adopted 
in both countries, rather than treating them in isolation. 
                                                 
16 The model is stylised because, to keep it tractable and to provide more intuitive results, we neglect some aspects 
(avenues for future research) regarding the financial sectors in the US and in China, the behaviour of privately and 
publicly owned companies in China, and the differences between portfolio and FDI financial flows.   
25 
The  model  shows  that,  as  long  as  the  Chinese  policy-makers  attach  more  weight  to 
increasing the economic size of their country than to boosting households’ consumption, they have 
an  interest  in  steering  the  Chinese  economy  towards  the  production  of  either  tradables  or 
nontradables, depending on the US policy actions. In particular, the model suggests that as long as 
the US monetary policy is not so tight that the real value of the US external debt exceeds a certain 
threshold, the Chinese authorities have a convenience to keep financing the US external deficits 
rather than appreciating the currency and depleting the accumulated stocks of foreign reserves.  
It is worth stressing that we do not associate either of the two periods in the model with a 
specific span of time: the reason is that the theoretical model is kept general enough to be suitable 
both for analyzing the Sino-America co-dependency through an historical perspective (starting with 
the adoption on a fixed exchange rate regime with the currency pegged to the US dollar in 1994 and 
ending at the time of writing) and for assessing the implications of plausible future scenarios that 
differ in terms of key economic policy choices. 
As  regard  the  implications  of  the  model  for  the  future  of  the  US-China  relationship,  a 
qualification  is  in  order.  Considering  that  hardly  anybody  would  encourage  the  US  monetary 
authorities to tight the monetary policy to the point to generate deflation, it could be argued that the 
abovementioned finding entails that the current Sino-American arrangement is unlikely to change in 
the predictable future. It should be kept in mind that this conclusion is valid ceteris paribus. In fact, 
some  aspects  of  the  current  arrangement  may  change.  First,  the  perfect  sterilisation  of  an 
increasingly amount of foreign reserves (key to make the monetary policies in the two countries 
independent)  may  turn  out  to  be  too  a  demanding  task  for  the  Chinese  monetary  authorities.
17 
Second, the Chinese leadership may review the overall objectives for the country, attaching a larger 
(lower) weight to household’s consumption (GDP growth) than in the past. (This possibility is 
indeed considered in the paper and we show that, under certain conditions, this occurrence may 
                                                 
17 China has maintained a high degree of domestic financial repression in order to facilitate the sterilisation of mounting 
foreign reserves and to drive the allocation of domestic investment across alternative uses. The distortions connected to 
these by-products of the sterilisation of the reserves might prove to be too high in the future.  
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negatively affect employment in both countries). Third, the growing riskiness associated with an 
increasing stock of US foreign debt (an issue that is admittedly not considered in the model) and the 
progressive decline of manufacturing sector in the US may lead to an overhaul of the US policy 
objectives in the medium and long term. 
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1) Solutions to the private agents’ optimization problems 
From  the  firms’  first-order  conditions  with  respect  to  labour,  one  can  derive  the  relative  price  of  the  
nontradable good in terms of units of the tradable good:  

















,                                  (A1) 
By considering the firms’ first-order conditions with respect to labour and the fact that the households’ 
labour supply is determined according to (12), one can derive the employment level in the nontradable sector 
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º F , and  where one can easily check that  0
jTt L < l . With reference to (A2), 
we consider parameter values and stocks of capital satisfying  
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a , one can conclude from 
(A4) that there exists an unique  pair  ) L , L ( jTt
-
jTt
+  satisfying  j jTt
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+ .  Notice  that  for  any 
LjTt such that 
+ < < jTt jTt
-
jTt L L L  one has unemployment in country j at time t.  
By maximizing the firms’ discounted sequence of profits with respect to the investment rate, one can obtain:  
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By considering (1) and (23), one can easily check that 
j
jNt jNt jNt L K C
g = ,  t=0,1.                                   (A8) 
By maximizing (13) subject to (14) with respect to CjTt and CjNt, one can use (A1) and (A8) to obtain:  
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= .          (A10) 
By maximizing (13) subject to (14) with respect to CjTt and Mj1, one can use (A9) to obtain: 
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= .                                             (A12) 
Finally, by considering (13), (14) and (15), one can easily conclude that it is optimal for the representative 
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2) Derivation of (30) 
By using (5), (A2), (A5) and (A9), one can rewrite  jN1 jT1 jT1 jT1
jT1
j1 I - I - C - Y
P
TA
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where one can easily check that  0
jT1 L > f . 
3) Derivation of (31) 
By using (A2), (A8) and (A9), one can rewrite 
j j - 1
jTt jNt jt C C C
h h =  as  
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where one can check that  0
jTt L < c . 
4) Derivation of (32) 
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 Thus, 
admitting  parameter  values  and  stocks  of  capital  at  time  1  such  that 
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 is decreasing in LjTt  for  jTt jTt L ˆ L £  
and increasing in LjTt  for  jTt jTt L ˆ L ³ . 
5) Derivation of the equilibrium relationship between the price of the tradable good and the quantity 
of money in period 0 and in period 1 
One  can  use  (A2)  and  (A12)  to  rewrite  (A10)  as 
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=  and  0
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Similarly,  one  can  use  (A2)  to  rewrite  (A11)  as  ) K , K , (L M P jN1 jT1 jT1 j1 jT1 g = ,  where 
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jT1 L > g .      
6) Derivation of (42) 
Considering  (A2)  and  (A15),  one  can  check  that,  if  at  time  1  the  equilibrium  emerging  in  China  is 
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The stocks of capital in period 1 depend on the investment decisions made in 0. Assuming that in country j 
there  is  unemployment  in  period  1,  and  taking  into  account  of 
) M M (
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P
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) K , K , (L M P jN1 jT1 jT1 j1 jT1 g = , (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A12), one can  rewrite the first-order conditions with 
respect to the investment rate in the two sectors (equations (A6) and (A7)) as, respectively, 
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Equation (A20) can be rearranged as 
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.    (A21) 
By using (A21), one can rewrite (A19) as  
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.    (A22) 
In the case of China, one can use (A17) and (A21) to substitute for LjT1, thus rearranging (A22) as 
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Notice that we consider parameter values and initial conditions such that the presence of unemployment in 
China  at  time  0  (
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.  Moreover,  these  parameter  values  and 
initial conditions are such that
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i) By using (3), (5), (7), (A2), (A9), (A21) and (A23), one can rewrite  chN0 chT0 chT0 chT0
chT0









ch0 r = , where  
) K K )( - 1 (
L
K





) - 1 (
- L K ) K , K , L (
chT0 chN0 ch
) - (1
1 - ) - 1 (




chT0 ) - 1 (
1
chN0 ch0 ch






































































+ £ £ chT0 chT0
-
chT0 L L L . 
Given  ach<gch,  it  is  necessarily  the  case  that  0
L


















) K , K , L ( r
 implies that  0
L
) K , K , L (
chT0
chN0 chT0 chT0 >
¶
¶r
 for any LchT0 such that 
+ £ £ chT0 chT0
-










) K , K , L ( r










 holds  for  any  LchT0  such  that 
+ £ £ chT0 chT0
-
chT0 L L L .    
ii) By using (3), (5), (7), (A2), (A9) and (A21), one can rewrite  usN0 usT0 usT0 usT0
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us0 = + ,  one  can  use  (A26)  and  (A27)  to  obtain  
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where 
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 and that the difference YusT1-CusT1 is relatively small with respect to both 
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us1 = + , one can express LusT0 as an implicit function of LchT0 and of the 










are  given,  
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respectively, by (A30) and (A32) (similarly, one can express LchT0 as an implicit function of LusT0 and of 
the initial conditions: LchT0=m(LusT0,KchN0,KchT0,KusN0,KusT0)). Considering (A31), (A33) and (A34), one 
can conclude that  0
chT0 L < x  (or that  0
usT0 L < m ), thus implying that given the equilibrium that will emerge in 













)] K , K (.), , K , K , L ( [
K
L
K ) - 1 (
) K , K , K , K , L (
1 -
)] - ( - - 1 [
) - (1 ) - 1 )( - (1
) - 1 (
1




usT0 ) - 1 (
1
usN0 us0
)] - ( - - 1 [
) - (1
chN0 chT0 usN0 usT0 usT0
) - 1 (
) - 1 )( - (1
us
) - 1 (
1 -
us
) - 1 ( - 1
us1 us
) - 1 (
1
usN0









usN0 usT0 usN0 usT0 usT0
us us us us us
























































































h a g h a

























+ £ £ usT0 usT0
-
usT0 L L L . As we know from (A15), the effect of a larger LusT0 on current consumption 
is negative, while its effect on next-period consumption is in principle ambiguous. Indeed, by inspecting 
(A35), one can observe that LusT0 affects Cus1 through two channels: it has an indirect effect on it via its 






a . In its turn, a larger LusT0 determines 
an increase in KusT1 by boosting the domestic production of tradables in period 0, but this effect of a larger 
LusT0 on KusT1 tends to be offset by the reduction in that period of the US import of tradables from China 
) 0 (
usT0 chT0 L L < m z . In contrast, the direct effect of a larger LusT0  on Cus1 is unambiguously negative for a 
country where households dedicate more than a modest fraction of their total consumer expenditures to the 
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